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THE (SURPRISING) TRUTH ABOUT
SCHIAVO: A DEFEAT FOR THE CAUSE OF
AUTONOMY
0. Carter Snead*
I. INTRODUCTION
A survey of the commentary following the conclusion of the
Theresa Marie Schiavo matter leaves one with the impression
that the case was a victory for the cause of autonomy and the
right of self-determination in the end-of-life context. According
to the prevailing account, the case involved a husband (Michael
Schiavo) fighting for his right as a spouse to vindicate his pro-
foundly disabled wife's wish to decline artificial nutrition and
hydration. To do so, Mr. Schiavo had to overcome the efforts of
his wife's parents (the Schindlers), and their religious conserva-
tive supporters (including politicians both in Florida and Wash-
ington), who fought to keep Ms. Schiavo alive at all costs. This
battle of autonomy versus the sanctity of all human life (howso-
ever diminished) raged throughout literally every branch of gov-
ernment, as well as in the national and international media. In
the end, though, it was the judicial branch that settled the mat-
ter, finding that Michael Schiavo had the right to implement his
wife's wishes, free from any governmental intervention or ob-
struction. It was a decisive victory for autonomy and privacy, and
demonstrated that an individual's desire to be free from un-
wanted life-sustaining measures can be honored, even after she
is silenced by severe cognitive impairment.
The foregoing narrative is compelling, easy to understand,
and fits perfectly within the overarching paradigm typically used
to interpret the cultural, legal, and political conflicts of present
* Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law School; former General Counsel, The
President's Council on Bioethics. Thanks to the editors of CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMENTARY for soliciting this essay. Special thanks to John A. Ritsick, Brian T.
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384 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:383
day America. The only problem with this widely shared under-
standing of the Schiavo case is that it is wrong in almost every
key respect. The above account misstates the formal question in
dispute, the principal focus of the Florida courts' inquiry, the
substance of the courts' various holdings, the basis for the courts'
decisions, and the character of the participants in the larger pub-
lic debate. In this essay, I will seek to correct these errors and
demonstrate that, contrary to popular understanding, it is the de-
fenders of autonomy and self-determination who should be most
troubled by what transpired in the Schiavo matter. Far from be-
ing a victory for the cause of freedom, it is instead a cautionary
tale of what can happen when the legal preconditions for exercis-
ing autonomy are absent or ignored.
II. WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED
It is useful to begin by noting briefly some of the more ob-
vious factual flaws in the prevailing narrative. Contrary to the
popular account, the Schiavo matter was not a dispute about
which principle-respect for autonomy or the sanctity of all hu-
man life-should govern decision-making regarding the admini-
stration of life-sustaining measures. Nor was it a case about
who-as between spouses and parents-is best situated to make
such decisions for incapacitated loved ones. It also was not a case
about who-as between the government and the private individ-
ual-should have the final say in this intimate and private do-
main.
To the contrary, both the Schindlers and Mr. Schiavo
agreed from the outset that the relevant good to be defended
was Ms. Schiavo's right to autonomy and self-determination. De-
spite the acrimony and discord between Mr. Schiavo and the
Schindlers, they were in complete agreement that the proper
task at hand was to discern and implement (if possible) Ms.
Schiavo's wishes regarding artificial nutrition and hydration.
Thus, the Schiavo case did not involve a philosophical quarrel
about what is owed to the profoundly disabled-all parties to the
conflict agreed that self-determination was the paramount value.
Rather, the case was essentially a factual dispute about the con-
tent of Ms. Schiavo's intentions. Mr. Schiavo argued that she
would not want to continue living under the circumstances, and
the Schindlers asserted the contrary' (or alternatively, that her
1. See generally Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 178-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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wishes had not been sufficiently established to support termina-
tion of artificial nutrition and hydration). Accordingly, the out-
come of the case cannot properly be interpreted as a victory for
the principle of autonomy over the sanctity of life, as some have
suggested. This deeper (and more interesting) dilemma was
never the focus of the litigants' or the court's inquiry.
The courts in this case likewise were not called upon to de-
termine which party-Mr. Schiavo or the Schindlers-was best
suited to act on behalf of Ms. Schiavo. Rather, the court took it
upon itself to determine the proper course of treatment for Ms.
Schiavo, based on its own assessment of the facts and law.4 The
Florida court's holding did not, therefore, authorize Mr. Schiavo
to make the final decision for Ms. Schiavo because he was her
husband. The court implemented its own determination regard-
ing this question. And it did so in a compulsory way-the care-
takers of Ms. Schiavo were required, on pain of contempt of
court, to follow the court's order to withdraw artificial nutrition
and hydration Thus, the Schiavo matter cannot properly be un-
derstood as a victory for spouses over parents in end-of-life deci-
sion-making, as some commentators have suggested.6 Similarly,
it should not be celebrated as a case in which the individual was
empowered to make her decision free from any governmental
intervention. It was, in fact, the government (namely, the Florida
judicial branch) that decided by its own lights what was owed to
Ms. Schiavo.
Though ancillary to the focus of this essay, a brief word
about the larger political debate is in order. The conventional
2001).
2. The Schindlers also raised the additional arguments that Ms. Schiavo was not in
a persistent vegetative state and that she could recover some of her lost faculties if she
were provided with the proper course of therapy. For reasons discussed below, however,
these arguments were ancillary to the central question before the court, namely, the con-
tent of Ms. Schiavo's actual intentions.
3. See generally Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Schiavo Case: The Legacy; A Collision
of Disparate Forces May be Reshaping American Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at A18
(describing the case as a conflict between those ethicists supporting "autonomy and self
determination" and "social conservatives who argue that sanctity of life trumps quality of
life").
4. See Schindler, 780 So. 2d at 178, 179 (noting that Mr. Schiavo "invoked the trial
court's jurisdiction to allow the trial court to serve as [Ms. Schiavo's] surrogate decision-
maker" and observing that in this case, "the trial court essentially serves as [Ms.
Schiavo's] guardian") (emphasis added).
5. See Schindler v. Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 559 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
6. See generally Arthur Caplan, The Time Has Come to Let Terri Schiavo Die,
MSNBC.COM, Mar. 18, 2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7231440/ (strongly suggesting that
the question before the court was whether or not Michael Schiavo should be allowed to
make the decision for Ms. Schiavo, given that he is her husband).
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wisdom seems to be that this case was merely another skirmish
in the now all too familiar conflict between religious conserva-
tives and secular liberals (and their occasional libertarian allies).7
But this view fails to capture the complexity and peculiarity of
the political dimension of the Schiavo matter. The political de-
bate did not feature the usual alignment of politicians and activ-
ists who regularly weigh in on contested social issues. Liberal
champions such as Senator Tom Harkin, Reverend Jesse Jack-
son, and Ralph Nader rose to the defense of the Schindler fam-
ily. Nearly half of the voting members of the Congressional
Black Caucus supported federal legislation to authorize the
Middle District of Florida to hear, de novo, any federal claims
asserted on behalf of Ms. Schiavo by the Schindlers.8 Indeed, not
a single U.S. Senator voted against this extraordinary avenue of
relief. To be sure, many liberals and conservatives intervened in
a manner that one might expect-the former for Mr. Schiavo
and the latter for the Schindlers. But these partisans made ar-
guments that seemed to be in deep tension with their overarch-
ing philosophies and ideological commitments. Conservatives
supporting the Schindlers abandoned both their longstanding
deference to the states and their usual opposition to additional
layers of federal procedural safeguards for civil rights (manifest
in their public arguments regarding the availability of habeas
corpus relief, particularly in the death penalty context). Con-
versely, liberals supporting Mr. Schiavo acted uncharacteristi-
cally by arguing for strict deference to the findings of the Florida
courts, and against additional federal process aimed at preserv-
ing the individual rights and liberties of the weakest and most
vulnerable among us. In a departure from the norm, conserva-
tives made impassioned pleas for substantive justice, and liberals
persistently argued for reliance on formal process. These inver-
sions and apparent contradictions in the political discourse were
oddly reminiscent of another high-profile case arising from Flor-
ida, just five years earlier.
7. See also Abby Goodenough, Victory in Florida Feeding Case Emboldens the
Religious Right, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24,2003, at Al; Editorial, Theresa Marie Schiavo, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 1, 2005, at A22 (describing supporters of the Schindlers as those who "hold
religious convictions so heartfelt that they could not bow to public opinion or the courts
and accept the conclusion that Ms. Schiavo should be allowed to die"). See generally Edi-
torial, Exploiting Terri Schiavo; A Blow to the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at
A22 (describing the supporters of the Schindlers as "members of the religious right").
8. See generally Erin Texeira, Schiavo Case Divides Black Leaders; Jackson Shows
African Americans' Conservative Side, CHi. SUN TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at 28.
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III. SCHIAVO'S IMPLICATIONS FOR AUTONOMY
Granting that the conventional understanding of the
Schiavo matter is technically mistaken and should be modified as
described above, why should it finally be regarded as a blow to
the cause of autonomy and self-determination in this particular
domain? To answer this question, it is necessary first to set forth
(in cursory fashion) the underlying aim of the defenders of
autonomy in this context. Then, it will be necessary to provide a
brief sketch of how the law-both as enacted and interpreted-
might ideally serve to promote and defend the goods of auton-
omy and self-determination. I will then use this standard to as-
sess the process and outcome of the Schiavo case. I submit that
judged according to this measure, it is clear that both the process
and result in the Schiavo case undermine the ideal of autono-
mous decision-making at the end of life, and should thus be con-
demned by those who champion these values in the public
square.
Before proceeding with this analysis, it bears noting that I
do not in this essay seek to resolve the rich and complex debate
over which moral and ethical principles should be paramount
when deciding how to act for a profoundly disabled loved one
who requires artificial nutrition and hydration, but cannot speak
for herself. By focusing exclusively on the principle of autonomy
and self-determination, I do not intend to imply that it should
have pride of place in such decisions, at the expense of other
goods and values. Indeed, I do not even mean to suggest that the
proper method for resolving ethical questions such as those pre-
sented by the Schiavo case is through applying or balancing ab-
stract principles as such. My narrow purpose in this essay is sim-
ply to demonstrate that the legal process utilized in the Schiavo
matter utterly failed to advance the cause of autonomy in the
end-of-life context.
A. THE VISION OF AUTONOMY AT THE END OF LIFE
The principle of respect for autonomy and self-
determination predominates in modem bioethics: "Because of
the intimate and intrusive nature of biomedical decisions, a cen-
tral focus of bioethics has been to respect and protect an indi-
vidual's autonomy in making those decisions." 9 Advocates for a
9. John A. Robertson, Precommitment Issues in Bioethics, 81 TEx. L. REv. 1849,
1849 (2003).
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robust notion of autonomy ground their claims in the "moral fact
that a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society as
a whole."10 The concept of personal autonomy as a principal
animating good is also well ensconced in the decisional law of
the U.S. Supreme Court: "It is settled now, as it was when the
Court heard arguments in Roe v. Wade, that the Constitution
places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's most
basic decisions... about bodily integrity.""'
The principle of informed consent-the cornerstone of
modem biomedical ethics-is in large measure an extension of
this general concept of personal autonomy. Under this venerable
doctrine, no medical intervention may be undertaken without
the intelligent and voluntary consent of the patient.12 Implicit in
this principle is the freedom to decline medical interventions, re-
gardless of their character (life-sustaining or otherwise).
The right to refuse medical treatment has come to be re-
garded as an essential mechanism for self governance at the end
of life: "[T]he choice between life and death is a deeply personal
decision .... [T]he Due Process Clause protects an interest in life
as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treat-
ment." 3
Under this view, autonomy demands that individuals have
the right to have their preferences regarding life-sustaining
measures honored and implemented, free from governmental or
private intervention.
B. THE LAW'S ROLE IN PROMOTING AND DEFENDING
AUTONOMY
What sort of legal framework is best suited to advance this
vision of autonomy at the end of life? First, there must be legis-
lation in place that makes the patient's subjective desires regard-
ing life-sustaining measures decisive, over and above any com-
peting claims raised by third parties or the state. The positive law
must provide a reliable and transparent mechanism for discern-
ing and implementing the wishes of the patient. An equally im-
10. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777
(1986) (Stevens, J. concurring) (quoting Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 288-89 (1977)).
11. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,849 (1992).
12 See generally Norman L. Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving
Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV.
228,237 (1973).
13. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,279-281 (1990).
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portant feature of such legislation is the presence of robust safe-
guards against abuse-including especially the imposition of the
preferences of some third party, the state, or even the court, un-
der the false pretense of implementing the patient's intentions.
Such displacement of the patient's desires by those of others, or
by some "reasonable person," "best interests," or "quality of
life" standard, is singularly anathema to the ideal of autonomy.
The risk of this sort of abuse is especially grave when the evi-
dence of the patient's intentions is scant or ambiguous.
Sound positive law, standing alone, is insufficient to realize
the vision of autonomy at the end of life. It is equally important
that the laws described above be scrupulously applied by those
charged with interpreting them. When undertaking to discern
the intent of the patient, judges should be particularly mindful of
the potential for abuse, as well as vigilant against the natural
human tendency to put a thumb on the scales in service of one's
own preferences or sympathies.
C. ASSESSING SCHIAVO: THE LAW'S FAILURE
Judged according to these standards, the process and out-
come in the Schiavo matter were woefully inadequate to ad-
vance the cause of autonomy and self-determination. The deci-
sional and positive law governing the Schiavo matter (and cases
like it) is imperfect, but generally oriented towards the values of
autonomy and self-determination at the end of life. However,
the interpretation and application of these laws by the various
courts hearing the Schiavo case profoundly undermined these
purposes by ignoring the very features of the law essential to
preserving autonomy in this context.
1. THE DECISIONAL AND POSrrIVE LAW GOVERNING
SCHIAVO
At the broadest level of abstraction, the overarching au-
thorities governing the Schiavo matter (and similar cases) are
quite friendly to the vision of autonomy and self-determination
described above. The Supreme Courts of the United States and
Florida have both recognized a right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment.14 Moreover, a person does not lose this right due to
14. 1& at 279 & n.7 (locating this interest in the "liberty clause" of the Fourteenth
Amendment and explicitly rejecting the view that the right to refuse treatment is
grounded in a generalized constitutional right of privacy); State v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4,
10 (Fla. 1990) (grounding the interest in the "right of privacy" provided by the state con-
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cognitive incapacity; such patients are entitled to have their prior
intentions honored and implemented.' 5 The Supreme Court of
Florida has held that this right to refuse treatment applies to any
form of intervention, life-sustaining or otherwise (including the
administration of artificial nutrition and hydration to non-
terminally ill patients, such as Ms. Schiavo).' In their compre-
hensive (and definitive) treatise on the law governing the end of
life, Professors Alan Meisel and Kathy Cerminara note that
there is an emerging consensus supporting this type of legal re-
gime." It is, without question, a framework that privileges per-
sonal autonomy and self-determination above other considera-
tions and values.
Similarly, the positive law governing the Schiavo case is, in
the main, structured to promote patient autonomy. Indeed, the
relevant Florida statutes enacted to regulate end-of-life decision-
making"8 adopt a purely subjective standard for those patients
(like Ms. Schiavo) who lack an advance directive memorializing
their intentions. For such cases, a third party may carry out the
patient's wishes, provided that there is "clear and convincing
evidence that the decision would have been the one the patient
would have chosen had the patient been competent."'9 The Flor-
ida statutory law closely tracks the purely subjective standard
previously articulated by the Florida Supreme Court: "One does
not exercise another's right of self-determination or fulfill that
person's right of privacy by making a decision which the state,
the family, or public opinion would prefer. The surrogate deci-
sion-maker must be confident that he or she can and is voicing
the patient's decision. ' 20
Thus, the Florida statutory authority provides that the subjective
intentions of the patient regarding end-of-life care are decisive,
over and above any other party's preferences. Within the spec-
trum of end-of-life regulation, Florida's laws arguably offer the
strongest protection possible for patient autonomy.
stitution) (courts and commentators refer to this case as In re Guardianship of Brown-
ing).
15. Herbert, 568 So. 2d at 12.
16. Id at 11, n.6.
17. ALAN MEISEL & KATHY CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 2.02, 2-5 (Aspen
3d ed. 2005).
18. See FLA. STAT. § 765.101-.546 (2003).
19. Id § 765.401(3). If such a determination of the patient's actual intentions is im-
possible, the surrogate may act in the patient's "best interests."
20. Herbert, 568 So. 2d at 13 (quoting In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d
258, 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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Florida law also includes robust safeguards intended to pre-
vent abuse and error, and to provide maximal assurance that the
action taken is truly what the patient would have wanted under
the circumstances. Its primary mechanism for these purposes is
the standard of proof used to evaluate evidence of the patient's
intentions. The patient's desire to decline life-sustaining meas-
ures must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence.",2' Fur-
thermore, the law provides that in the face of any ambiguity, the
court is to presume that the patient would have chosen to "de-
fend life in exercising his or her right of privacy."' By adopting
the highest evidentiary threshold available in civil cases, the
Florida law aims to provide the utmost degree of certainty that
the decision ultimately made truly reflects the wishes of the pa-
tient who has been silenced by her disability. It goes without say-
ing that an erroneous decision to terminate life-sustaining meas-
ures based on unreliable evidence of a patient's wishes is a grave
violation of her right to autonomy and self-determination. A
lower evidentiary standard would increase the risk of such error.
Moreover, a lesser standard would make it far easier for third
parties to succeed in imposing their own preferences at the ex-
pense of those of the patient. Similarly, a more permissive stan-
dard would allow the court to indulge its understandable, hu-
man, yet clearly impermissible impulse, to decide the case
according to its own subjective assessment of the patient's qual-
ity of life. In short, the clear and convincing evidence standard-
a bulwark against possible abuse and a means of ensuring a reli-
able result-is an absolutely crucial element of the Florida law's
effort to promote the actual exercise of autonomy by patients no
longer capable of expressing their wishes.
It is noteworthy that the Florida law allocates the risk of er-
ror to the party seeking to discontinue life-sustaining measures,
presumably on the theory that an erroneous decision to termi-
nate such treatment is irremediable. By contrast, an erroneous
decision to continue life-sustaining measures results in preserva-
tion of the status quo, allowing for the possibility in the future
that new evidence of the patient's subjective preferences will
come to light, such that her right to self determination can finally
(and reliably) be vindicated.
21. FLA. STAT. § 765.401(3).
22. Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (quotation
omitted).
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Florida law also aims to prevent error and abuse by provid-
ing for the appointment of a guardian to ensure that the wishes
of the patient are being identified and implemented, particularly
when proxy decision-makers are unavailable or unwilling to do
so. 3 Moreover, the Florida law makes clear that the presiding
judge may not serve simultaneously as arbiter of the case at hand
and the guardian of the patient2' In this way, the Florida law at-
tempts to prevent any party-including the court-from suc-
cumbing to the temptation of substituting its own judgment for
that of the incapacitated patient.
The final safeguard against abuse and error provided by the
Florida law is the nature of the court's jurisdiction in such mat-
ters. The jurisdiction exercised in cases such as Schiavo's is that
of a guardianship court; its orders to terminate life-sustaining
measures are executory in nature, meaning that even after the
decision is rendered, the court retains jurisdiction until the death
of the ward: "[A]s long as the ward is alive, the order is subject to
recall and is executory in nature. "' In practice, this means that
the court's decision is subject to change and revision based on
alteration of the underlying facts or law.26 This is in stark contrast
to a final judgment, which may not be disturbed after it is ren-
dered. The policy reason for designating judicial orders termi-
23. See generally FLA. STAT. § 744.404. Note, however, that the Florida courts re-
viewing the Schiavo matter did not make full use of this provision; there was only one
guardian ad litem (appointed in 1998) who represented Ms. Schiavo's interests-attorney
Richard Pearse. His term of service was quite brief, and his tenure was not renewed. In-
stead, the trial court chose to serve as Ms. Schiavo's guardian in this case, noting that an
additional guardian ad litem would "tend to duplicate the function of the judge, would
add little of value to this process, and might cause the process to be influenced by hear-
say or matters outside the record." Schindler, 780 So. 2d at 179. Dr. Jay Wolfson later
served as guardian ad litem pursuant to legislation passed by the Florida state legislature
in 2003. Dr. Wolfson's tenure was also quite brief, and the law authorizing his service was
declared unconstitutional.
24. See § 744.309(1)(b). Note, however, that this is precisely what the court did in
the Schiavo case. See supra notes 4, 23.
25. See Schiavo v. Schindler, 792 So. 2d 551, 559 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (empha-
sis added). Note, however, that the Florida Supreme Court, without explanation or even
a single citation to relevant legal authority, declared the order in Schiavo to be final
rather than executory. Relying in significant part on this error, the Florida Supreme
Court declared the interventions of the Florida Legislature and Governor Jeb Bush (via
"Terri's Law") to be unconstitutional. See Bush v. Schiavo, No. SC04-925, 2004 WL
2109983 (Fla. Sept. 23, 2004). For an extended discussion of executory judgments in the
separation of powers context, and for a critique of the Florida Supreme Court's decision
in this regard, see 0. Carter Snead, Dynamic Complementarity: Terri's Law and Separa-
tion of Powers Principles in the End of Life Context, 57 FLA. L. REv. 53 (2005).
26. See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 344 (2000) ("Prospective relief under a
continuing, executory decree remains subject to alteration due to changes in the underly-
ing law.").
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nating life-sustaining measures as executory is clear-if subse-
quent changes in the law or facts compel the conclusion that the
original judgment was erroneous, a mechanism to amend the re-
sult is still available. In this way, the Florida law creates another
legal hedge against the possibility of a mistaken factual conclu-
sion regarding the patient's true wishes.
Despite its strong orientation towards vindicating the
autonomy and self-determination of incapacitated patients like
Ms. Schiavo, the law in Florida is imperfect in one crucial re-
spect: It provides no clear means of resolving disputes between
family members with competing views of the patient's subjective
preferences regarding the administration of life-sustaining meas-
ures. The law does provide, as described above, for the appoint-
ment of a guardian to advise the court when no family member is
willing or able to serve as a proxy decision-maker, but the law
provides little more by way of guidance.
2. THE ADJUDICATION OF SCHIAVO
While Florida's positive and decisional law governing end-
of-life decision-making is imperfect, it is generally structured in
such a way as to defend and promote autonomy. In stark con-
trast, the application and interpretation of these laws by the
courts hearing the Schiavo case directly and persistently under-
mined these values in a manner that should be distressing to
anyone who aspires to self governance at the end of life. Con-
trary to popular understanding, the courts charged by the Flor-
ida laws with discerning and implementing Ms. Schiavo's wishes
paid scant attention to the centrally important question of her
actual subjective intentions, and focused most of their time and
energy on ancillary factual questions relating to the nature of her
condition and the possible benefits of various therapies. Such
questions are more appropriate to a "best interests" or "quality
of life" approach, which are paternalistic in character and con-
trary to the values undergirding the principle of autonomy. To
the extent that the courts did take steps to discern Ms. Schiavo's
wishes, they did so in an unrigorous and unreliable manner, ig-
noring crucial procedural safeguards prescribed by the Florida
guardianship laws. As a result, it is impossible to have any confi-
dence that the conclusions reached by the courts accorded with
Ms. Schiavo's actual wishes. If the court's order to terminate ar-
tificial nutrition and hydration was indeed a fulfillment of Ms.
Schiavo's subjective desires, this is a happy accident. It was
394 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:383
manifestly not the result of a judicial process calculated to ad-
vance autonomy and self-determination.
Mr. Schiavo's legal efforts to discontinue artificial nutrition
and hydration for his wife lasted seven years. However,
throughout this entire period, there was only one evidentiary
hearing (in 2000) devoted to the question of Ms. Schiavo's
wishes regarding life-sustaining measures. By any measure, the
evidence presented at this hearing was scant, vague, and contra-
dictory. Nevertheless, the court inexplicably concluded that Ms.
Schiavo's desire to discontinue artificial nutrition and hydration
had been proven by "clear and convincing" evidence.2 By abro-
gating its responsibility to scrupulously and rigorously apply this
evidentiary standard, the court untethered itself from the essen-
tial mechanism provided by the Florida law for ensuring a reli-
able determination of Ms. Schiavo's wishes.
To fully appreciate the deeply flawed nature of this judicial
determination, and to understand its implications for the ideal of
autonomous decision-making at the end of life, it is necessary to
consider briefly the jurisprudence of the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard in this context. Even a cursory account of
how courts have consistently applied this evidentiary standard in
end-of-life disputes demonstrates the extraordinary degree to
which the Florida courts in Schiavo departed from its proper ap-
plication.
As mentioned above, the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard is the highest available in civil cases. To satisfy this
standard, evidence must be "so clear as to leave no substantial
doubt" and be "sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating
assent of every reasonable mind."' To further illustrate the
quantum of evidence that is necessary to meet this threshold,
consider the following: "The evidence must be of such weight
that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations
sought to be established."29 One court put it even more strongly,
27. See generally In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
February 11, 2000) [hereinafter Feb. 2000 Order] (granting authorization to Michael
Schiavo to discontinue artificial life support for Theresa Marie Schiavo).
28. Conservatorship of Wendiand, 26 Cal. 4th 519, 552 (2001) (quoting In re Angel
P., 28 Cal. 3d 908,919 (1981)).
29. Inquiry Concerning Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994). See also Matter of
Jobes, 529 A.2d 434,441 (N.J. 1987)
(Evidence is "clear and convincing" when it produce[s] in the mind of the trier
of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable
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noting that the clear and convincing evidence standard requires
the trier of fact to be "convinced as far as humanly possible" that
the evidence presented truly represents the wishes of the now-
incapacitated patient.0
What specific criteria should a trier of fact look to in evalu-
ating evidence of a patient's intent regarding end-of-life prefer-
ences? While Florida law is silent on the specific application of
the "clear and convincing" standard in the end-of-life context, a
significant number of other jurisdictions have developed a well-
settled, uniform, and consistent body of persuasive authority that
provides surprisingly clear answers. In cases like Ms. Schiavo's,
where the evidence presented consists entirely of past oral com-
munications to others, such statements must demonstrate a
"firm, settled,... serious, well thought out, consistent decision to
refuse treatment under these exact circumstances or circum-
stances highly similar to the current situation. '"' The weight the
trier of fact must accord to such oral communications depends
on the "remoteness, consistency, specificity, and solemnity of
[the] prior statements. 3 2 Only reflective, deliberate, solemn, and
consistent remarks expressing the desire to decline the type of
life-sustaining treatment at issue are sufficient to meet the clear
and convincing threshold.
Similarly, courts have unambiguously described the types of
prior statements that do not satisfy the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard in the end-of-life context. Not surprisingly, evi-
dence that is "loose, equivocal, or contradictory" falls short of
the clear and convincing threshold.33 Prior statements about end-
of-life preferences that are "general, remote, spontaneous, and
made in casual circumstances" are routinely held to be unreli-
able by courts applying the clear and convincing standard.34
Courts in cases like Ms. Schiavo's have consistently held that fi-
delity to the clear and convincing evidence standard requires re-
liance only on prior statements that speak to the exact (or nearly
exact) circumstances at hand. There have been many cases in
[the fact finder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of
the precise facts in issue.)
(emphasis added).
30. Matter of Westchester County Med. Ctr. On Behalf of O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d
607, 613 (N.Y. 1988) (emphasis added).
31. In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399,411 (Mich. 1995) (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc., 148 A.D.2d 244 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989).
34. Jobes, 529 A.2d at 443.
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which a court has declined to authorize termination of life-
sustaining measures because the now-incapacitated patient's
prior remarks about end-of-life preferences spoke to circum-
stances distinct from those presented. For example, in Wendland
v. Wendland, an individual (Mr. Wendland) who became se-
verely cognitively impaired in an automobile accident had previ-
ously been heard to say (to numerous witnesses) that he would
never want to live "like a vegetable." However, the court held
that this did not constitute clear and convincing evidence suffi-
cient to discontinue life-sustaining measures, given that his pre-
sent condition was technically not vegetative, but rather "mini-
mally conscious."35 Similarly, in In re Martin, the court held that
a patient's prior statements that he did not wish to have his life
preserved artificially by a machine or if he were ever in a vegeta-
tive state, were not clear and convincing evidence supporting a
decision to discontinue life-sustaining measures in the circum-
stances presented because Mr. Martin was neither in a vegetative
state, nor relying on a machine to sustain his life artificially.36 He,
like Mr. Wendland, was in a minimally conscious, yet incompe-
tent state.
Courts have not only described the types of prior statements
that fall short of the clear and convincing evidence standard;
many courts have gone so far as to enumerate specific comments
that should be deemed presumptively unreliable by triers of fact
seeking to discern an incapacitated patient's preferences regard-
ing life-sustaining measuresY For example, there seems to be
wide agreement among courts considering the question that
prior "statements made in response to seeing or hearing about
another's prolonged death do not fulfill the clear and convincing
standard" of evidence required to show that the incapacitated
patient would have wanted medical treatment withheld.3" Simi-
larly, courts have expressed serious doubts about the reliability
of an "off-hand remark about not wanting to live under certain
circumstances made by a person when young and in the peak of
35. Conservatorship of Wendland, 26 Cal. 4th 519,519 (2001).
36. Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 399.
37. Wendland, 26 Cal. 4th at 519
38. Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 416; see also Jobes, 531 N.E.2d at 412 (declaring that "in-
formally expressed reactions to other people's medical condition and treatment" are not
clear and convincing evidence of one's own intentions regarding life-sustaining meas-
ures); Matter of Westchester County on behalf of O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 532 (N.Y.
1988) (deeming as unreliable "immediate reactions to the unsettling experience of seeing
or hearing of another's unnecessarily prolonged death"); Elbaum, 148 A.D.2d at 253
(same).
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health."39 Courts have likewise observed that a prior statement
that a person would not "want to be a burden" should not be re-
garded as clear and convincing evidence of a desire to decline
life-sustaining measures.' In a similar vein, courts have ex-
pressed the view that general statements made in the past that
one would not want "to be sustained on anything artificial" or on
"life supporting machinery," do not constitute clear and convinc-
ing evidence necessary to discontinue life-sustaining measures."
As discussed above, the central purpose of the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard is to ensure reliability in determining
the now-incapacitated patient's intentions. One court cautioned
that reliance on statements like the foregoing could potentially
yield disastrous results:
If such statements were routinely held to be clear and con-
vincing proof of a general intent to decline all medical treat-
ment once incompetency sets in, few nursing home patients
would ever receive life-sustaining medical treatment in the fu-
ture. The aged and infirm would be placed at grave risk if the
law uniformly but unrealistically treated the expression of
such sentiments as a calm and deliberate resolve to decline all
life-sustaining medical assistance once the speaker is silenced
by mental disability.42
What, then, persuaded the reviewing courts that Ms.
Schiavo's desire was to decline life-sustaining measures under
the circumstances? What quantum of proof was marshaled to
demonstrate this proposition to the satisfaction of the most ex-
acting evidentiary standard available in civil cases? A careful re-
view of the record reveals a jarring truth: The evidence deemed
"clear and convincing" in the Schiavo case was a veritable pa-
rade of every species of presumptively unreliable statement long
rejected by courts across the nation called upon to adjudicate
end-of-life disputes.
At the January 2000 trial, the court heard from five wit-
nesses who recounted past comments by Ms. Schiavo ostensibly
relating to her end-of-life preferences. Two witnesses, Mary
Schindler (Ms. Schiavo's mother) and Diane Meyer (Ms.
Schiavo's childhood friend) testified that, based on conversations
with Ms. Schiavo about the widely publicized Quinlan case (in-
39. Jobes, 529 A.2d at 443 (quoting In the Matter of Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230
(N.J. 1985)).
40. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 607.
41. See id.; see also Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1209.
42. O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d at 614.
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volving a dispute about termination of life-sustaining measures),
they believed that Ms. Schiavo would not, under the circum-
stances, elect to decline artificial nutrition and hydration.4' An
additional witness, Jackie Rhodes, testified that in the many
times she and Ms. Schiavo had visited her grandmother in a
nursing home, Ms. Schiavo never expressed to her that she
would wish to decline artificial nutrition and hydration were she
ever to fall into a profoundly dependent condition. Three wit-
nesses: Michael Schiavo, Scott Schiavo (Mr. Schiavo's brother),
and Joan Schiavo (Mr. Schiavo's sister-in-law) testified that Ms.
Schiavo had, at various times, expressed her desire to decline
life-sustaining measures under certain circumstances.
In making its decision, the court discounted the testimony of
Rhodes, Schindler, and Meyer. Judge Greer deemed the
Schindler testimony to be unreliable based on his understanding
that Ms. Schiavo's comments were made in 1976 (the year in
which Judge Greer thought Ms. Quinlan had died), when Ms.
Schiavo was only eleven or twelve years of age." In fact, Judge
Greer's understanding of the Quinlan chronology was mis-
taken-Karen Ann Quinlan died in 1985, which would suggest
that Ms. Schiavo's remarks could have been made when she was
between the ages of seventeen and twenty (as Ms. Schindler had
originally asserted at the hearing). Similarly, Judge Greer dis-
counted the Meyer testimony based on the same error; he re-
garded Meyer's testimony as uncredible because Meyer implied
that Karen Quinlan was still alive in 1982.45 Judge Greer was
"mystified" by Meyer's testimony and concluded that the con-
versation must have taken place in the 1970s, when Ms. Schiavo
was a child.' But this, of course, was not necessarily so. Thus,
Judge Greer discounted evidence that Ms. Schiavo would not
choose to decline artificial nutrition and hydration, based in sig-
nificant part, on an easily verifiable factual error about a histori-
cal event.
Far more troubling than what the Florida court discounted
as credible, was what it took to be "clear and convincing." Judge
Greer's conclusion that Ms. Schiavo would want under the cir-
cumstances, to decline artificial nutrition and hydration, relied
43. Transcript of Record at 372-73, 762, In re Guardianship of Schiavo No. 90-
2908GD-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. January 2000) [hereinafter Jan. 2000 Hr'g] (direct examina-
tions of Mary Schindler and Diane Meyer, respectively).
44. Feb. 2000 Order, supra note 27, at 9.
45. Id. at 5.
46. Id.
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entirely on four statements she allegedly made regarding her
own treatment in the event that she should become profoundly
disabled. First, the court relied on Mr. Schiavo's testimony that
many years prior on a train ride, Ms. Schiavo stated that if she
"ever had to be a burden to anybody like [her uncle was to her
grandmother], [she didn't] want to live like that."" Ms. Schiavo's
uncle had been in a car accident, and was disabled: His right arm
was paralyzed; he walked with a severe limp; and had slurred
speech.4 Ms. Schiavo's elderly and ailing grandmother was the
sole caretaker for the uncle. Second, Mr. Schiavo testified that
he and Ms. Schiavo watched documentaries involving disabled
individuals who were profoundly dependant upon others. In re-
sponse to the suffering of these patients, Ms. Schiavo purport-
edly asked Mr. Schiavo not to "keep her alive on anything artifi-
cial. ,
49
The third statement relied upon by the court was the testi-
mony of Scott Schiavo that in 1986, at the funeral following the
death of his grandmother, Ms. Schiavo made remarks indicating
what her views were regarding life-sustaining measures. ° Scott
Schiavo's grandmother had been maintained at the end of her
life solely by a host of life-sustaining machinery against her
clearly stated wishes. According to Scott Schiavo's testimony,
the interventions sustaining his grandmother included "some-
thing that is breathing for you... [and devices that] pump[]
blood [into your heart] and oxygen to your brain and everything
else."' He described the machinery as "lifting [her] off the bed
for air ... [and causing] her chest [to] pump[] up."' 2 At the fu-
neral for his grandmother, all of the grandchildren were express-
ing their anger that the grandmother had been "kept alive on a
machine" against her wishes, "after she was gone."'' According
to Scott Schiavo, Ms. Schiavo added her thoughts in response to
the suffering of the Schiavo grandmother and stated, "if I ever
go like that, just let me go. Don't leave me there. I don't want to
be kept alive on a machine."" This comment-made at the re-
ception following the Schiavo grandmother's funeral-was the
47. Jan. 2000 Hr'g, supra note 43, at 30-31. (direct examination of Michael
Schiavo).
48. See id. at 32.
49. Id. at 33.
50. See Feb. 2000 Order, supra note 27, at 9.
51. Jan. 2000 Hr'g, supra note 43, at 100 (direct examination of Scott Schiavo).
52. Id. at 110.
53. Id. at 102.
54. Id.
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only remark Scott Schiavo ever recalled Ms. Schiavo making
about life-sustaining measures." Curiously, Scott Schiavo failed
to mention this one instance to anyone until nine years after Ms.
Schiavo became severely cognitively disabled and profoundly
dependant.
The final comment relied upon by Judge Greer to support
his conclusion regarding Ms. Schiavo's wishes was reported by
Joan Schiavo, Mr. Schiavo's sister-in-law (the wife of his brother,
Scott Schiavo).56 Joan Schiavo testified that:
We had watched a movie one time on television. It was about
somebody. I don't remember. It was about a guy who had an
accident and he was in a comma [sic]. There was no help for
him. We had stated that if that ever happened to one of us, in
our lifetime, we would not want to go through that. That we
would want it stated in our will we would want the tubes and
everything taken out.57
Joan Schiavo further testified that she thought that the
character in the movie was sustained on a "breathing machine"
or a "feeding machine., 58 Joan Schiavo added, however, "I don't
remember the movie. I really don't remember the movie.,
59
Nevertheless, she seemed to recall that the character's condition
was terminal, and that he died within "months to a year, '
though she added again that she wasn't sure about this aspect of
the movie either."1 Joan Schiavo, like her husband, failed to men-
tion this conversation until nine years following Ms. Schiavo's
collapse and disability.
These four statements were the sum and substance of the
evidence upon which Judge Greer based his conclusion that Ms.
Schiavo would want to terminate artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion under the circumstances presented. That such evidence
would be regarded as "clear and convincing" is nothing short of
astonishing. To the contrary, all of the foregoing comments are
paradigmatic examples of statements that courts routinely deem
to be presumptively unreliable. First, all of the four statements
were "general, remote, and made in casual circumstances." All
of the statements were made at least five years prior to Ms.
55. See id. at 105.
56. See Feb. 2000 Order, supra note 27, at 9.
57. Jan. 2000 Hr'g, supra note 43, at 233 (direct examination of Joan Schiavo).
58. Id. at 234.
59. Id. at 239 (cross examination of Joan Schiavo).
60. Id. at 240.
61. Id.
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Schiavo's collapse. Two of the four statements were made while
watching television or movies; one was made during a casual
conversation on a train; one was made during an informal (and
highly emotionally charged) conversation at a reception follow-
ing a funeral. Each statement could also fairly be characterized
as an "off-hand remark about not wanting to live under certain
circumstances made by a person when young and in the peak of
health."
Most damningly, all of the statements attributed to Ms.
Schiavo were "made in response to seeing or hearing about an-
other's prolonged death," a category of comment that courts
regularly dismiss as unreliable. Compounding this error, all of
the statements were made in response to circumstances factually
dissimilar to Ms. Schiavo's. Ms. Schiavo's condition was non-
terminal. She was not in a coma. Most experts have described
her condition as a "persistent vegetative state," characterized by
"the absence of cognitive behavior of any kind, and an inability
to communicate or interact purposefully with the environ-
ment." ' She was not maintained on a ventilator or other "ma-
chine." She did, however, receive artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion by means of a PEG tube. By contrast, Ms. Schiavo's uncle's
condition was nothing like hers-he suffered from paralysis in
one arm, difficulty walking, and slurred speech. Likewise, Ms.
Schiavo's condition did not resemble those of the terminally ill
comatose character from the movie she and Joan Schiavo pur-
portedly viewed together (to the extent that Joan Schiavo was
able to recall the details of this film). Nor was Ms. Schiavo's
condition like that of the Schiavo grandmother, who was termi-
nally ill and required all manners of invasive machinery to sus-
tain her life. Finally, it is not clear at all that Ms. Schiavo's condi-
tion matched those of the individuals in the documentaries that
Mr. Schiavo claimed that they watched together. If Judge Greer
had followed the well-developed body of persuasive authority
for interpreting such evidence, he would have been compelled to
conclude that these statements were not sufficient to support a
decision to terminate life-sustaining measures for Ms. Schiavo.
In another departure from the well-established jurispru-
dence in this area, Judge Greer chose to rely on statements that
were near verbatim examples of comments that courts uniformly
62. The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Am. Acad. of Neurology, Medical As-
pects of the Persistent Vegetative State-First of Two Parts, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED 1499,
1499 (1994). Ms. Schiavo's parents and their supporters strenuously objected to Ms.
Schiavo's diagnosis in this regard.
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deem presumptively unreliable. Specifically, Judge Greer
pointed to Ms. Schiavo's remarks that she "would not want to be
a burden," and that she would not want to be sustained "on any-
thing artificial" or "on a machine" as a basis for his decision to
withdraw her PEG tube.
Finally, in crediting the testimony of Michael Schiavo, Judge
Greer relied on evidence that was patently "equivocal and con-
tradictory." Mr. Schiavo's testimony that his wife would want to
cease life-sustaining measures, based on his recollection of prior
conversations, squarely contradicted his own testimony given
under oath in prior judicial proceedings. First, during the dam-
ages phase of a medical malpractice suit brought on his wife's
behalf shortly after her collapse, Mr. Schiavo requested compen-
sator damages sufficient to care for her "for the rest of [his]
life." Indeed, he testified that he was studying to become a
nurse so that he could care for her for the rest of her life, which
was not expected to be cut short by her disability." At this trial
he made no mention of the fact that, based on her prior ex-
pressed wishes, he would shortly thereafter decide against sus-
taining her life by artificial means. But this is precisely the deci-
sion that Mr. Schiavo made-a fact that caused Guardian ad
Litem Richard Pearse to view with deep skepticism the entirety
of Mr. Schiavo's comments regarding his wife's wishes.5
Moreover, Mr. Schiavo's account of his wife's wishes di-
rectly contradicted comments that he made in a November 1993
deposition in which he discussed his decision not to treat his
wife's urinary tract infection. Mr. Schiavo stated that it was his
desire at that point to allow Ms. Schiavo to succumb to the infec-
tion because this is what she would have wanted under the cir-
cumstances." However, when asked why he refused to take the
advice of a physician who suggested that Mr. Schiavo remove
her feeding tube (because, according to the physician Ms.
Schiavo had "died four years ago"), Mr. Schiavo responded "I
couldn't do that to Terry [sic]."'67
Judge Greer's determination that the insufficient testimony
described above was "clear and convincing" evidence was af-
firmed by the intermediate appellate court, though in doing so,
63. Trial Transcript at 28, Barnett Bank Trust Co. v. Igel, No. 92-000939-15 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. 1992) (Michael Schiavo direct examination, Nov. 5, 1992).
64. Id. at 26-27.
65. Jan. 2000 Hr'g, supra note 43, at 698-99.
66. Michael Schiavo Dep. 15, Nov. 19, 1993.
67. Id. at 33-34.
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the court observed that the statements attributed to Ms. Schiavo
were "few and ... oral."" Immediately thereafter, the Schindlers
came forward with testimony from several witnesses, including
an affidavit from a former girlfriend of Mr. Schiavo (Trudy Ca-
pone), in which she stated, under oath, that Mr. Schiavo admit-
ted to her on numerous occasions that he had no idea what Ms.
Schiavo would choose under her present circumstances. 9 The
trial court barred this testimony as untimely. The intermediate
appellate court affirmed this judgment but noted that on re-
mand, the Schindlers would be permitted to file a revised motion
for relief under a separate rule of procedure if they could "plead
and prove newly discovered evidence of such a substantial na-
ture that it proves" that Ms. Schiavo would not wish to terminate
artificial nutrition and hydration under the present circum-
stances.70 On remand, Judge Greer concluded that this evidence
failed to present a "colorable claim for entitlement to relief from
the judgment." This conclusion was affirmed on appeal.71
The only questions that the Florida courts were willing to
entertain for the balance of the litigation (from 2001 until 2005)
had little or no relevance to discerning Ms. Schiavo's actual
wishes. There followed a protracted dispute about the nature of
Ms. Schiavo's condition, namely, whether it could fairly be char-
acterized as a persistent vegetative state and whether she might
benefit from experimental therapies. As suggested above, these
inquiries are more appropriate to those approaches to end-of-life
decision-making that turn on what a reasonable person would
want under the circumstances, what constitutes the "best inter-
ests" of the patient, or what actions the patient's current quality
of life would require. Whatever the virtues of these approaches
.might be, their aim is manifestly not to vindicate the autonomy
of the patient by discerning and implementing her actual wishes,
as reflected by her prior statements.
CONCLUSION
The Schiavo case has been discussed at length by the legal,
political and cultural commentariat. The bulk of such discussion,
however, has been based on false factual premises. A careful re-
68. Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176,180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
69. Trudy Capone Aff. 1, May 9, 2001 ("[Michael Schiavol said to me many times
that he had no idea what [Ms. Schiavo's] wishes were.") (on file with author).
70. Schindler v. Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
71. Schindler v. Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640,643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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view of the record reveals that the Schiavo matter should not be
regarded as a victory for spouses over parents or the individual
over the government in making decisions about life-sustaining
measures. Most importantly, however, a clear understanding of
the Schiavo case compels the conclusion that it does not, con-
trary to popular understanding, represent a victory for the right
of autonomy and self-determination in this context. In fact, the
opposite is true. While the law governing that case was generally
(though imperfectly) calibrated to vindicate these values, the
sloppy and seemingly indifferent manner in which the Florida
courts approached the crucial (and decisive) question of Ms.
Schiavo's wishes prevented the realization of this goal. The Flor-
ida courts abandoned the single most important mechanism the
law provided for ensuring that Ms. Schiavo's wishes would be re-
liably discerned and implemented-the clear and convincing
evidence standard of proof. As a result, it is not possible to have
any confidence that Ms. Schiavo's actual intentions were hon-
ored. Not only did the Florida courts persistently refuse to rigor-
ously pursue the question of Ms. Schiavo's actual wishes, they
employed the bulk of their resources to conduct inquiry into
questions relating to Ms. Schiavo's present and future quality of
life. This approach is inconsistent with the ideals of autonomy
and self-governance at the end of life. Far from being a victory
for freedom, the Schiavo matter represents an abject failure of
the law to provide the framework within which autonomy might
truly be exercised.
